Is Iran the new Iraq?

To many observers, this feels like Iraq in 2003 all over again.

The administration has begun using the phrase — or some variation of — “short-term pain for long-term gain.”

Let me be clear: my goal here is not to support or critique the Trump administration’s decision to attack Iran or the possibility of placing U.S. troops on the ground.

Instead, my objective is to highlight why comparisons to the 2003 invasion of Iraq — still vivid in the memories of many Americans — can be misleading when made without nuance. Failing to heed the lessons of the past can be dangerous.

If we are not careful, the pain may not be short — and the goals may remain elusive.

Iran is not Iraq.

The Iranian military has already shown itself to be a formidable adversary.

In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq, I was a graduate student at MIT. The political science department is known for its expertise in security studies, and it was common to find active-duty military officers sitting alongside graduate students in seminars.

One concept we discussed frequently was asymmetrical warfare, particularly as we tried to anticipate how Iraq might respond to a U.S. invasion.

In simple terms, asymmetrical warfare occurs when two sides possess vastly unequal military capabilities. The weaker side compensates by employing unconventional strategies designed to survive, inflict losses and prolong the conflict.

Like Iran’s supreme leader today, Saddam Hussein was removed from power relatively early in the Iraq War. U.S. officials hoped Saddam’s capture would accelerate the regime’s collapse and allow a transitional government to stabilize the country.

That is not what happened.

The Iraqi military quickly dissolved. Members of the former regime’s officer corps turned to insurgency. Guerrilla warfare spread rapidly, and sectarian violence compounded an already unstable and violent environment.

Eventually Iraq stabilized — but at enormous cost to the United States.

This is where comparisons with Iran become more concerning.

No one — including Iran — denies that U.S. military power is vastly superior. The difference may lie in Iran’s capacity to apply the principles of asymmetrical warfare.

There is already evidence of this.

Iran’s response to strategic bombing has included unconventional tactics designed not to match U.S. military power directly, but instead to impose economic and logistical costs on the United States and its allies.

Intelligence estimates suggest Iran possesses as many as 80,000 drones and can produce up to 500 per day. These drones are inexpensive and easily transported. Iranian Shahed drones, for example, cost roughly $20,000 to manufacture.

The cost to shoot them down is dramatically higher. U.S. interceptor missiles can range from $500,000 to $4 million each, and standard military practice recommends firing two interceptors to ensure a successful interception.

Last June alone, the United States reportedly fired roughly 150 interceptors in just 12 days to help defend Israel — a staggering cost. These interceptors are also time-consuming to manufacture.

This is asymmetrical warfare in practice.

Flood the skies with cheap drones and ballistic missiles. Force the United States and its allies to track threats moving at different speeds and altitudes simultaneously. Drain interceptor stockpiles while imposing enormous financial costs.

There is another factor in this equation: home-field advantage.

In warfare, where you fight can matter just as much as the weapons you bring.

More than half of Iran is mountainous terrain. The Zagros Mountains stretch across much of the western portion of the country, with peaks reaching nearly 14,000 feet. The Alborz Mountains seal off the north. These regions are defined by narrow passes, steep terrain and harsh conditions that make large-scale armored movement extremely difficult.

Any ground invasion of Iran would make Iraq — and even Afghanistan — look comparatively simple.

It would almost certainly produce higher casualties, higher costs and a much longer conflict.

Regardless of what one believes the Trump administration should do next, one lesson from history remains clear:

Military superiority does not automatically translate into victory.

Iran is not Iraq.

Marco Durazo, Ph.D., lives in San Bruno, teaches at USF, and is writing a book about Latino Immigrants and the U.S. military.